It doesn't seem as though real life is planning to let up anytime soon, so here's a quick summary of my thoughts on the subject if you're still interested.

It is beyond doubt that people with a deathwish disgust Nietzsche. At the same time, he is also in favor of risking your life to reach unprecedented heights of greatness. I think Neitzsche's master/slave dichotomy is a reference to Hegel, who says a slave is the man who first surrenders in a fight out of his ignoble fear of losing his life. Hegel thinks there are certain advantages to being a slave, because masters are later moved by considerations of what's beneficial to the slave.

Nietzsche doesn't like the domestication of the master by his slaves. When we liberals think of consequentialism, we imagine optimizing the management of an estate, with your life as a crucial asset. Nietzsche would deride the idea of saving your life by coldly betting on minimax as a refuge of the last man derived from Anglo-Dutch commercialism. Supermen joyously endanger their lives in their relentless pursuit of satisfaction, emerging unscathed in spirit or succumbing to the trial. It may appear to last men like me that supermen have a deathwish, but supermen would hesitate to acknowledge that I am even truly alive. Interestingly, Christians would also say I am refusing things like grace and eternal life.

An important difference between liberals and Moldbug is that liberalism is concerned with showing all parties that to a certain extent, achieving their own ends requires them to get along with whatever other parties happen to be present at the moment. When Moldbug was a libertarian, he had a pure vision of an ideal society that he believed his libertarian policies would create. Later, he lost faith that his espoused means would bring about his desired ends. So now he wants all parties to drop their personal agendas and build his shining city for him.

Does Moldbug think rational humans would share his belief that his ideal society is an optimal point to which they ought to attune their goals? He should, because he asks his readers to mortify their will to power where it contradicts his ideal. What reasons does he give that's sufficient to make us think bringing about his dream state is the way we should truly wish to expend our power? Throughout his writings, there runs a vein of burning personal incredulity that smart and rational people would want anything else. He shares horror stories about discrimination against people with his views. He jokes about liquefying unprofitable slobs into petroleum, and then suggests driving them into virtual reality instead. Both courses of action are unprofitable in the extreme, but apparently analyzing the specific processes by which means lead to ends is the lure of demotism, whereby kings are reduced to algorithms, because Moldbug seems content to leave all the actual work of showing that things will turn out okay to the expertise of whoever his king decides to hire. (He has actually stated that his monarchism is deduced from first principles. Your first principles are less relevant to other people than observable consequences.)

Now, it's certain that Moldbug's arguments, such as they are, have a consequentialist bent, (Believe it or not, Buddhist philosophy justifies itself on pragmatic grounds.) and maybe his rhetorical tactics are consequentially optimal in Moldbug's position, but the question is, is a system of consequentialism or intentionalism being advocated here? Nietzsche's values may differ from ours, but liberals nonetheless assume that you will remain true to your own interests. All they say is look at all the awesome things we could have if we'd work together. Sure, Moldbug courts consequentialists, framing the problem as "good intentions X are incompatible with the expedient means leading to (my wants) Y", but Catholics think a sizable portion of their beliefs is rational too. At the end of the day, Moldbug wants you to mortify your aspirations where his ideals are concerned and back his personal agenda. He does not bother to rigorously argue that you should, because he assumes you agree with him already. From a functional perspective, Moldbug's conception of "rationality" behaves a lot like what Nietzsche would call "good intentions".

Pthagnar: You do realize that your problem with treating nonpersons as people is a complaint against inconsistency, not consistency? In the real practice of analysis, you get to add as many distinctions as you want, change theories and combine them until you are satisfied. Frankly, since appealing to reason involves expressing yourself in generalities, from what you say, I have no good reason to agree or disagree with anything you say. If there is a good reason to take you seriously, it can be expressed rationally.

(Good thing I copied the post before editing it. Can we not have one-click delete so close to edit, please?)